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Russia Isn’t Going to Run Out of Missiles

Photo: CHRISTOF STACHE/AFP/Getty Images

Commentary by Ian Williams

Published June 28, 2023

Long-range missile strikes against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure have been a prominent and persistent aspect of the Kremlin’s war against Ukraine. Earlier this year, the CSIS report Putin’s Missile War found that Russian missile attacks in 2022 had caused major damage to Ukraine’s economy and infrastructure but had failed to achieve the kind of decisive strategic effects that Moscow had likely sought. Into 2023, Russia has persisted in expending expensive, long-range missiles in regular attacks against a variety of civilian and military objects across Ukraine. The focus of these strikes regularly shifts and their intensity has ebbed and flowed, as has the quality of employed munitions.

However, Russia’s continued strike campaign in 2023 has made one thing quite clear: it is unrealistic to expect Russia to ever “run out” of missiles. Despite sanctions and export controls, it appears likely that Russia will be able to produce or otherwise acquire the long-range strike capacity necessary to inflict significant damage upon Ukraine’s people, economy, and military. Ukraine’s air defenses have performed remarkably well under challenging circumstances. Nevertheless, the Russian military has continued trying to identify gaps and seams to exploit to gain an advantage.

There is no one-off fix for this problem. Sanctions and export controls can, at most, limit the quantity and quality of strike assets Russia can acquire. The most reliable counter is sustained Western support for Ukrainian air defense forces for the duration of the conflict. The continued, steady provision of air defenses into the foreseeable future will save lives, reduce costs of future reconstruction, and help end the war more quickly by enabling Ukraine’s counteroffensive in the face of superior Russian airpower. Moreover, providing air defenses has also forced Western countries to scale up production of these systems, which could have long-term benefits for Western defense readiness.

Russia’s Latest Assault

In May, Russia renewed its long-range drone and missile attacks on Ukrainian cities. This surge in activity came after a relative period of lull in March and April, following Moscow’s furious yet unsuccessful strike campaign aimed at collapsing Ukraine’s electric grid last winter. Unlike that singularly focused effort, Russia’s recent spate of missile and drone attacks since May has been aimed at a seemingly broader and less predictable target set.

For instance, Russia has used some of its most advanced and expensive missiles in a failed bid to destroy one of Ukraine’s U.S.-German-provided Patriot batteries protecting Kyiv. Moscow likely believed that the prompt destruction of a Patriot battery—one of the costliest weapon systems Ukraine has received—would discourage continued Western military aid. However, this line of attack backfired as the Patriot battery survived nearly unscathed. The Patriot battery reportedly shot down 100 percent of the 34 Iskander and Kinzhal quasi-ballistic missiles Russia has fired at Kyiv as of June 28, weapons that Moscow had once touted as impervious to air and missile defenses.

In other instances, assessing what Russia has been aiming at has been more challenging since most projectiles get shot down. Targets, though, seem to include a mix of critical infrastructure, command and control installations, and other military and civilian targets. Kyiv has borne the brunt of Russia’s latest assault. Still, Russia has, in more recent weeks, expanded its scope to other areas, possibly looking to exploit areas of Ukraine where air defense is thinner. On June 10, Russia struck a Ukrainian air base in Poltava with a complex barrage of eight ballistic and cruise missiles and as many as 35 Shahed-36 one-way attack munitions. Ukraine says it shot down only two cruise missiles, while 15 Shahed-136s made it through Ukrainian defenses. Russia has not carried out a major missile attack on a Ukrainian air base since the early months of the war, and likely that the area lacked the same level of air defense as Kyiv. Poltava probably lacks protection from Patriot, currently Ukraine’s only defense against ballistic missiles.

As with much of Russia’s air campaign against Ukraine, civilians have suffered the most. In many cases, damage to civilian areas has resulted from falling debris from intercepted missiles. Although much less destructive than allowing a missile to strike its target, debris from intercepts can still kill, maim, start fires, and otherwise damage property. In other instances, Russia appears to be attacking civilians directly. On June 13, Russia launched a cruise missile attack against Kryvyi Rih . At least one of the four missiles that got through Ukraine’s defenses struck an apartment building, killing 11.

Overall, the performance of Ukraine’s air defenses has steadily improved since the start of the war, particularly against Russian cruise missiles. Throughout much of Russia’s winter campaign against Ukraine’s electric grid, Ukraine’s Air Force reported intercepting around 70–80 percent of Russian cruise missiles. Since May, Ukraine has reported intercepting around 90 percent of Russian cruise missiles and drones (see below). Ukraine has reported downing nearly 80 percent of air and ground-launched ballistic missile attacks nationwide and 100 percent of ballistic missiles attacking areas where ballistic missile defenses (Patriot) are present. Ukraine only has two Patriot batteries. As such, most of Ukraine lacks any protection from ballistic missiles, as shown by the June 10 Iskander-M strike in Poltava and the June 22 Kh-47 strikes around Dnipro, which Ukraine could not stop.

While lacking the focus of prior phases of Russia’s long-range strike campaign, Russia’s current objectives seem primarily aimed at keeping Ukraine off balance during its counteroffensive operations in the South, to force Ukraine to divert air defense capacity to defend its cities. Given the limited supply of Ukrainian air defenses, a generalized and unpredictable strike campaign forces Ukraine to make difficult tradeoffs between defending its cities and critical infrastructure and providing thicker air defense for its troops on the front lines.

SHORAD Concerns

As Ukraine’s spring counteroffensive has gotten underway, observers are concerned that Ukraine is facing a gap in short-range air defenses (SHORAD) for its advancing troops. Russia’s use of attack helicopters like the Ka-52 armed with laser-guided 9K121 “Vikhr” missiles has been of particular concern to attack advancing Ukrainian armor. These missiles have a range of upwards of 12 kilometers, outside the range of many of Ukraine’s SHORAD systems like Strela, Stinger, StarStreak, and Igla variants. Ukraine’s medium-range air defenses, like IRIS-T, Buk, and NASAMs, are stretched between frontline duty and defending rear areas against long-range attacks. UK Defence Intelligence recently noted that Russia had deployed 20 additional attack helicopters to Berdyansk, and that “in the constant contest between aviation measures and countermeasures,” Russia had temporarily gained the upper hand.

Ukrainian Air Defense Performance by Threat Type, May 1–June 26, 2023

It is unclear how long Russia will be able to maintain this advantage, however. Ukraine already seems to be adapting, claiming to have shot down six Ka-52s and one Mi-24 attack helicopter since June 16. Moreover, Wagner forces shot down as many as seven additional Russian helicopters during its recent mutiny, including one Ka-52. To be sure, Russia’s attack helicopters are not a plentiful asset. Russia started the war with around 150 Ka-52s. It is doubtful that all of these were mission capable. In October 2022, UK Defence Intelligence estimated Russia to have had no more than 90 Ka-52s in service at the war’s commencement. Based on visual analysis by independent observers and reports from the Ukrainian Air Force, Russia has lost as many as 60 Ka-52s since the start of the war from enemy fire as well as accidents. The Ka-52 problem is not insurmountable, and Russia’s attack helicopter force cannot sustain the rate of losses they have sustained over the past week. However, ensuring that Ukraine has adequate medium- and short-range air defenses to support its counteroffensive over the coming months will be vital to its success. Moreover, additional long-range strike assets, such as Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) ballistic missiles, would enable Ukraine to better target the bases Russia is using to house and maintain its attack helicopters, many of which are within the borders of Ukraine.

Russia’s Evolving Strike Complex

As early as March 2022, there was much conjecture that Russia’s supply of precision-guided missiles was dwindling . These reports may not have been entirely off the mark. Russia probably did quickly expend the portion of its long-range missile that it had initially allocated to its “special military operation.” Nevertheless, Russia maintained a steady drumbeat of missile strikes against Ukraine, likely by pulling munitions allocated to other theaters and drawing down its strategic reserves. Moreover, Russia has repurposed various surface-to-air and anti-ship missiles for land attack roles. Russia has also continued to manufacture missiles throughout the war, and evidence suggests that most (possibly all) Russian cruise missiles it has in its current inventory come from postwar production.

The exhaustion of prewar missile stockpiles has impacted the composition of current Russian strike salvos. Compared with previous phases of Russia’s air war, the composition of Russian missile attacks has trended away from high-end missile systems like cruise missiles toward cheaper, less capable “low-end” systems like Shahed-136 one-way attack munitions (see below). In the first three months of 2023, during the tail end of Russia’s strike campaign against Ukraine’s electric grid, Shahed-136s accounted for around 40 percent of long-range projectiles fired at Ukraine. Since April, 61 percent of long-range munitions Russia has employed have been Shahed-136 one-way attack munitions. Compared to cruise and ballistic missiles, Shahed-136 are generally easier to shoot down and more vulnerable to cheaper defenses like the German-made Flakpanzer Gepard and other gun-based systems. The Shahed-136’s warhead weight is also only between that of a cruise missile like Kh-101, and therefore causes less damage when they do make it through defenses.

However, the decline in the quality of Russian long-range strike salvos is unlikely to continue. Rather, the overall composition of Russian strike packages will likely level off as Russian missile use becomes fully tethered to how many missiles it can produce. But it is improbable that Russian production of higher-end cruise and ballistic missiles will ever fall to zero. Despite Western sanctions and export controls of key microelectronic components, Russia has been able to find workarounds to continue producing missiles. In May, Ukrainian intelligence estimated that Russia currently manufactures around 60 cruise missiles, five Iskander ballistic missiles, and two Kinzhals monthly. In June, President Zelensky noted that Ukraine continues to find Western-made microelectronic components amongst the wrecks of Russian missiles. These components are likely finding their way into Russia via friendly third parties such as China.

The United States and Europe can and should seek ways to further restrict the flow of dual-use tech components to Russia. It is, however, unrealistic to expect they will be able to completely deprive Russia of the components it needs to manufacture missiles. Sanctions and export controls have never prevented proliferation by a determined state, let alone one with Russia’s size and economic reach. What they can do is make it harder and more expensive, which would limit the number of missiles it can produce. Regardless of how many missiles the Kremlin produces today, it wishes it could make more. Export controls can help limit that potential.

But the upshot is that Russia will continue having the capacity to build missiles and drones and will continue to fire them at Ukraine. This reality will not change until the war ends. Meanwhile, active air defense remains the most reliable counter to Russian missile attacks, requiring continued support and replenishment from Ukraine’s international partners.

Composition of Russian Missile Attacks on Ukraine, January 1–March 31, 2023

Composition of Russian Missile Attacks on Ukraine, April 1–June 22, 2023

Folks Are Getting It

The good news is that Ukraine’s partners seem to understand the air defense imperative and are responding. Ukraine’s most recent military aid packages have been heavy on air defenses.

Since May, the United States announced it would supply Ukraine’s Armed Forces with additional rounds for NASAMS and Patriot, Avenger air defense and Stinger missiles, and HAWK air defense systems. The United States is also supplying Ukraine with older AIM-7 Sparrow missiles, which have been made compatible with Ukraine’s Buk M2 systems, for which Ukraine has ample launchers though few remaining interceptor missiles.

On June 15, the United Kingdom announced a new multinational fund that would be used to procure “hundreds of short and medium range air defense systems” for Ukraine, noting these deliveries would consist “largely of Soviet-era missiles.” The United Kingdom had also announced in mid-May that it would provide additional air defenses to Ukraine, though it did not specify the type.

French president Macron also recently announced that a French/Italian-provided SAMP/T system is now active in Ukraine, protecting “key installations and lives.” Germany delivered the second of four promised IRIS-T SLM air defense systems in April, along with an additional TRML 4D radar. Berlin also announced on June 24 that it plans to provide Ukraine with 45 more Gepard Flakpanzer systems, more than doubling the number Ukraine currently operates.

These contributions to Ukraine, while reducing national stockpiles of munitions in the short term, have the added benefit of bolstering the production lines of several key air defense systems. Having warm production lines for these complex systems could boost U.S. and allied defense readiness in the long term over and above the risks of near-term drawdowns.

For instance, the U.S. Army expects Stinger production to rise by 50 percent by 2025. As part of that ramp-up, at least one critical component of the Stinger has been redesigned in such a way as to overcome current supply chain issues. The United States is also increasing the production of Patriot systems. There are also significant increases in NASAMS production, and the United Kingdom recently announced it was restarting production of its Starstreak air defense system.

No Permanent Fix

Looking ahead, there is no simple solution to the Russian missile problem. Russia will continue to produce and acquire missiles and one-way attack munitions and use them to target Ukraine. Sanctions and export control can make this harder and costlier for the Russians, but they will not stop them. As long as the war continues, Ukraine must maintain a robust air and missile defense, which will require steady support from the United States and its many other international partners.

To this end, Western defense industrial capacity for everything from air defense interceptors to precision-guided munitions needs to be scaled up and new supply chains built. This process will not only help the United States maintain the steady support that Ukraine needs to win the war as quickly as possible, but it will also leave the United States and its allies in a stronger position to deter and defeat future threats.

Ian Williams is a fellow in the International Security Program and deputy director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2024 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

Ian Williams

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Weapons tracing shows Russia firing new cruise missiles at Ukraine just weeks after production

In one case where two kh-101 missiles were recovered and examined after striking kyiv in november 2022, car researchers were able to determine that one of the munitions was produced in the last quarter of 2022, most likely october. .

A Russian Kh-101 air launched cruise missile reportedly shot down by Ukrainian air defenses. (Ukrainian Air Force on Twitter)

BELFAST — Weapons researchers have gathered examples of newly-produced Russian cruise missiles that have been used against Ukraine , in what they say is a sign that Russia’s stockpile of munitions has become so thin weapons are being used in the war just a few months after assembly.

The discovery implies that Moscow is facing serious stockpile issues and increased production pressure that “might not be indefinitely sustainable,” according to Damien Spleeters, deputy director of operations at the Conflict Armament Research (CAR) group, a UK based weapons tracking organization. The news comes as Britain warns Russia is trying to rebuild its cruise missile stockpile.

Spleeters revealed to Breaking Defense that during a recent trip to Ukraine, his team recovered parts from a Kh-59MK2 air-to-surface missile that struck Ukrainian territory in March 2023, with CAR tracing production of the weapon to Q4 2022.

That’s a strikingly quick turnaround from production to use, but it isn’t even the fastest rate of use CAR has found. In another case, two Kh-101 missiles were recovered and examined after striking Kyiv in November 2022, with CAR researchers able to determine that one of the munitions was produced in the last quarter of 2022, most likely October.

CAR can be so precise about the provenance of the missiles because the first three serial number digits from both the Kh-101 and Kh-59 are linked to the factory of manufacture, with the next three digits linked to a “certain model,” said Spleeters. “That’s followed by one digit for the quarter of the year and one digit for the year of production.”

Besides Kh-101 and Kh-59 weapons, a wide variety of other Russian air launched cruise missiles have been found in Ukraine including Kh-22, Kh-29, Kh-31, Kh-47M2 Kinzhal and Kh-555 types, according to CSIS.

CAR’s findings line up with broader evidence that Russia’s stockpiles of cruise missiles are thinned out after 15 months of war.

In a May 3 UK intelligence update , the British military said that two air-launched cruise missile strikes against Ukraine, performed April 28 and May 1, were the first time in 50 days that ALCMs were used by Russian forces. According to the report, “both strikes used smaller numbers of missiles than seen in previous attacks, which is likely due to Russian attempts to rebuild its ALCM stockpiles.”

Another piece of evidence that Russia’s stockpiles are thin comes from reports that Russia’s fleet of Su-34s, normally used to launch ALCMs, have instead been operating with “dumb” bombs.

RELATED: A Russian Su-34 accidentally bombed a Russian city. Here’s what it tells us about Putin’s forces.

“I think we have reached a turning point where certain Russian stocks and components are getting low and have to be replenished,” said Spleeters. “From what I have seen of post invasion Kh-59 produced missiles, they are based on a mix of Russian and Western components made before the war, so Russia still appears to be relying on older stockpiles.”

At a wider level, CAR has assessed thousands of Russian weapon components and communication devices recovered in Ukraine, largely it says, manufactured between 2014 and 2021.

“This really indicates that Russia had a very consistent stockpile effort before the invasion, knowing that new export control measures and sanctions would be imposed and trying to be as resilient as they could before starting the invasion,” added Spleeters. “That’s why it will take time to see the effect of sanctions, but they will certainly have an effect for sure.”

US officials, including undersecretary of defense for policy Colin Kahl, have previously predicted that international export controls will make Russian stockpile rebuilding “a lot harder” especially in regard to accessing microchips to recapitalize precision guided missiles and standoff munitions.

Russia has used more than 5,000 missiles and “one way attack drones” since the war started in February 2022 and expended “much of its pre-war stockpile of precision-guided missiles” according to a May 2023 report from CSIS.

The same report, which describes Russia’s missile strike campaign as “strategically ineffective,” identifies potential capability flaws of Russian missiles, including Ukrainian authorities reporting Kh-101 shoot down incidents that call into question the purported stealth characteristics of the weapon.

The Ukrainian Air Force also said in a social media post Saturday that it had successfully downed a Kinzhal hypersonic missile over Kyiv with a Patriot air defense system. Russia has consistently championed the modern munition as one especially difficult to intercept based on a claim it can fly at 10 times the speed of sound.

Pentagon press secretary Brig. Gen. Pat Ryder confirmed on Tuesday that a Patriot system shot down a Russian missile over Ukraine, but would not confirm if it was a Kinzhal or not.

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Russia continues to manufacture cruise missiles despite Western sanctions, experts say.

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By John Ismay

Some of the cruise missiles that Russia launched at Ukraine’s civilian infrastructure in late November were manufactured months after the West imposed sanctions intended to deprive Moscow of the components needed to make those munitions, according to a weapons research group.

Experts examined remnants of Kh-101 cruise missiles found in Kyiv, the capital, after an attack on Nov. 23 that knocked out electricity and shut down water systems in large areas of the country. One of the missiles was made this summer, and another was completed after September, markings on the weapons show, according to a report released by the investigators on Monday .

That Russia has continued to make advanced guided missiles like the Kh-101 suggests that it has found ways to acquire semiconductors and other matériel despite the sanctions or that it had significant stockpiles of the components before the war began, one of the researchers said.

The findings are among the most recent by Conflict Armament Research , an independent group based in Britain that identifies and tracks weapons and ammunition used in wars. A small team of its researchers arrived in Kyiv just before the attack at the invitation of the Ukrainian security service.

John Ismay is a Pentagon correspondent in the Washington bureau and a former Navy explosive ordnance disposal officer. More about John Ismay

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How many missiles does Russia have left?

People have been having this argument since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

Western claims that Russia is running out of advanced, high-precision missiles have floated in the news since March . But more than 10 months into the all-out war, Russian missiles continue to rain down on Ukrainian cities.

The question of how many of them are left became especially stark in the past three months, when Russia began pounding Ukraine’s energy grid with mass attacks every 1-2 weeks. These strikes used a range of different missiles, some repurposed from their primary uses, backed up by Iranian kamikaze drones.

The short answer is, no one outside Russia has indisputable numbers on its stockpiles and production rates. Ukraine released figures but they have not been independently verified. There are also estimates from Western analysts relying on observable clues.

Many estimates agree on one thing: Russia’s strategic bombing campaign is burning through missiles at an unsustainable rate. If it keeps going, Russia should come to a point where it won’t be able to launch mass strikes every 1-2 weeks anymore, even if it keeps dipping into its strategic reserves.

Ukraine says that this point is just three mass strikes away.

But Russia won't run out — as in, literally have no more missiles to shoot, even if its stocks are truly that low. So far, it’s been able to continue manufacturing modern cruise missiles in spite of sanctions and reportedly has a plan to source missiles, in addition to drones, from Iran. 

In short, missile strikes will continue but they may soon become less frequent and drones might have to do more heavy lifting. But to achieve its strategic bombing goals – destroy Ukraine’s energy system – Russia needs to be able to hit Ukraine with as much as it can, as often as it can.

Ukrainian estimates

Ukraine’s most detailed claim about Russia’s missile situation came in a chart tweeted by Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov on Nov. 22, purporting to show the difference in Russia’s arsenal between Feb. 23, before the full-scale invasion, and Nov. 18.

The chart says Russia went from 900 Iskander ballistic missiles to 119, making only 48 new ones in this period. Reznikov claimed that Russia had spent 391 of its 500 Kalibr cruise missiles, while making 120 new ones. For Kh-101 cruise missiles, 132 were used, while 144 were left in stockpile, with 120 newly manufactured.

According to Reznikov, Russia also used half of its stock of 300 Kh-555 cruise missiles, as well as 16 of its 42 Kinzhal ballistic missiles, though it built 16 more to replace them. Anti-ship missiles like the Onyx (Oniks) have been repurposed to fire on Ukrainian land targets as well. Reznikov’s chart said Russia used 123 out of a stockpile of 470.

The chart also provided figures on other missiles — Kh-22s and Kh-32s (pre-war stockpile of 370, with 250 used); and Kh-35s (pre-war stockpile of 500, with 360 more built and 504 used).

A chart tweeted by Ukraine's defense minister on Nov. 22, claiming to list how many precise missiles Russia had had, used and built.

Reznikov’s chart quickly became out of date as Russia launched hundreds of missiles at Ukraine throughout December.

In a more recent, Jan. 4 statement, Vadym Skibitsky, spokesman of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Defense Ministry, said that Russia had enough advanced missiles left for up to three massive attacks, if each one uses about 80 missiles. Similar estimates were echoed by other Ukrainian officials.

After that, Skibitsky said, Russia would be stuck waiting for the factories to pump out enough for each subsequent attack — at a rate of about 50 cruise missiles produced per month. As for ballistic missiles, Military Intelligence Chief Kyrylo Budanov said Russia is barely making any Iskanders. The production rate for Kinzhals appears to be low as well, according to the defense ministry.

Russia responded to speculations with bravado. Deputy Head of Russia’s Security Council Dmitry Medvedev said in December that the country would ramp up production of new-generation weapons.

Moscow on Dec. 29 boasted that it will never run out of Kalibrs. The statement didn’t mention other types but Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly talked about developing new hypersonic weapons.

Russia then kept bombarding Ukraine through the New Year holiday weekend. Since then, almost two weeks have gone by without a mass strike. But Natalia Humeniuk, Ukraine's Southern Operational Command spokeswoman, said on Dec. 11 that Russia is preparing to unleash another massive missile strike very soon.

Expert analysis on production and use

Ukraine’s estimates should be taken with a grain of salt. It is one of the war’s direct participants and its defense relies on control of information and ability to attract military aid from other countries.

However, Ukraine’s intelligence came out with some of the most pessimistic estimates about how fast Russia can make cruise missiles. And there are publicly available clues in the way Russia uses its missiles that suggest stockpile depletion.

At the start of the full-scale invasion, the most modern missiles took to the air in large numbers. Over time, Russia began mixing in older models, even less accurate ones from Soviet times. In recent barrages, Russia would send its old Kh-55 cruise missiles without payloads, to trip up Ukraine’s air defenses.

An analysis by the Jamestown Foundation said that some Soviet missiles that Russia's been using are no longer reproducible, while others are made at a very low rate.

Russian forces also repurposed anti-ship missiles like the Onyx and anti-air missiles like the S-300 to strike at ground targets, suggesting they’re forced to use what they’ve got.

A few open source investigations at least partly support the claim that lately, Russia’s been using missiles that were manufactured earlier this year, which may indicate stockpile issues.

A team from Conflict Armament Research, a U.K. investigative organization that tracks weapon supplies, analyzed pieces from a Nov. 23 attack — three missiles were Kh-101s whose serial numbers show they were produced just months before the attack. CAR suggested that this may be symptomatic of stockpile challenges for assets like cruise missiles but Russia is still able to produce them.

The Long War Journal, a U.S. publication reporting on and analyzing wars, examined the photographed serial numbers from 16 downed Kh-101s, six of which are thought to have been made in 2022. According to its analysis of limited data, the Long War Journal’s most conservative estimate is that Russia can produce one Kh-101 missile every four days.

Jamestown estimated that Russia's maximum annual production capacity is not likely to be higher than 225 missiles in total, which includes Onyx, Kalibr, Kh-101, 9M729 and Kh-59 cruise missiles and Iskander-M ballistic missiles.

A June article from the Center for European Policy Analysis stated that Russia’s been running its missile factories in overtime. This includes the Novator plant, which made up to 120 Kalibrs and several dozen Iskanders per year before the full-scale invasion, according to CEPA. There is also the Votkinsk plant, which makes Iskander, Yar and Bulava missiles, whose production grew from 50 to 60 missiles per year in 2022.

Interestingly, these appear to be more optimistic estimates than Ukraine’s, whose military intelligence said Russia makes 30 Kh-101s in a single month, along with 20 Kalibrs.

Russia also hoped to receive ballistic missiles from Iran whose military doctrine is centralized around missiles and drones and has a production program for both.

U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby said Russia’s relationship with Iran was becoming a "full-scale defense partnership," with Russia providing advanced tech to Iran as well. Despite initially denying it, Iran supplied Russia with hundreds of Shahed-136 and Shahed-131 kamikaze drones that were used to attack Ukrainian cities.

And yet, Israeli intelligence officials last month told Axios that Iran wants to limit the range of missiles it plans to send to Russia. Last month, Ukrainian Presidential Office adviser Mykhailo Podolyak said Iran had not yet delivered the missiles to Russia and was wavering as a result of diplomatic pressure, the threat of additional sanctions, and internal political strife.

Russia evades sanctions blocking electronics

The most advanced and precise missiles require advanced electronics. Sanctions have been placed on Russia to limit its access to this technology. Even so, Russia seems to have been able to go on producing weapons. Defense intel firm Janes told the New York Times that Russia probably stockpiled microchips before February 2022.

According to an August report by the Royal United Services Institute, more than 450 foreign-made parts have been found in Russian weapons in Ukraine, acquired from the U.S., Europe and Asia in the years before the invasion. Many of the microelectronics found in the weapons were quite old. Western parts were also found in Iran's Shahed drones as well, according to the Conflict Armament Research team.

Moreover, Russia has likely been able to get around restrictions altogether. Reuters cited Russian customs records in reporting how at least $2.6 billion in computer and other electronic components flowed into Russia in 2022, at least $777 million of which were made by Western firms, whose chips have been found in Russian weapon systems.

Middlemen included firms in Turkey, Hong Kong and elsewhere, but there are even customs records showing shipments of components directly from the EU. The European Commission did not reply to Reuters' questions but claimed to take the issue seriously.

In short, export controls have not been effective enough to prevent Russia from getting the parts it needs to build more advanced missiles.

Moscow gave no indication that it plans to stop striking Ukrainian infrastructure. But limited resources may reduce the frequency of the strikes or force Russia to change its strategy.

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Western sanctions have failed to undermine Russia’s weapons production and Moscow has even managed to ramp up the manufacturing of key weapons to fuel its war against Ukraine , according to a new report by a London-based think tank.

The sanctions effort has been hampered by overly cautious decision-making by Western governments and delays in sharing intelligence among Western allies, said the report by the Royal United Services Institute. 

Although the U.S. and its partners have touted an array of sanctions over the past two years to choke off Moscow’s access to key parts needed to build weapons, Russia has dramatically increased the production of artillery rounds, cruise missiles, ballistic missiles and drones since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, according to the report.

In 2021, before Russian forces invaded, Moscow produced 56 Kh-101 cruise missiles a year. By last year, it had manufactured 460 cruise missiles, according to the report. Russia’s stock of Iskander ballistic missiles also has increased dramatically, from about 50 before the invasion to 180, even though Russia has launched large numbers of the missiles on the battlefield, it said.

To make munitions for missiles and drones, Russia depends on micro-electronics imported from abroad, but U.S. and European measures have failed to block Moscow’s access to those electronic components. Russia has maintained an ample supply of antennas manufactured by an Irish company that are used in glide kits for bombs, according to the report. 

The expansion of Russia’s weapons production offers clear evidence that thousands of Western sanctions have proved ineffective, the report said. “In summary, despite the diligent efforts of many civil servants, backed by the political will to disrupt Russia’s military–industrial output, there is little to show for it,” it said.

The U.S. Treasury Department this month announced a new set of sanctions over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, including penalties for foreign banks that deal with Russia’s economy and restrictions to block the export of certain U.S.-made software and IT services to Russia.

The authors of the report argue that it is still possible for the U.S. and its allies to choke off the supply or prohibitively raise the cost of electronic components, machine tooling and raw materials needed for Russia’s weapons production. 

To make sanctions stick, governments need to share relevant intelligence — including classified information — rapidly to allow for timely enforcement of export controls or action. Western governments should form an “intelligence fusion center” that could build “a common recognized target picture of the Russian defense industry,” it said.

Better intelligence sharing would also allow allies to undertake coordinated action — including clandestine measures — to undercut Russia’s weapons production, the report said.

There are “multiple stages throughout the production process where intervention, both overt and covert, can cause delay, the degradation in quality, or a serious increase in cost to Russia’s arms production,” the report said.

Dan De Luce is a reporter for the NBC News Investigative Unit. 

Country: Russia

25 items, page 1 of 0, kh-55 (as-15).

The Kh-55 (NATO: AS-15 “Kent) is an air-launched cruise missile developed by the Soviet Union starting in 1971. Originally designed as a strategic system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead 2,500 km, the missile has given rise to several variants. These include the Kh-55SM, an extended range version; the Kh-555, a conventional version; and the...

3M-14 Kalibr (SS-N-30A)

The 3M14 Kalibr (NATO: SS-N-30A) is a Russian land attack cruise missile (LACM) and improved version of the 3M-14E “Club” LACM. The SS-N-30A has an estimated range of around 1,500 to 2,500 km and has become a mainstay in the Russian Navy’s ground-strike capabilities. Kalibr Development Although commonly referred to as the Kalibr cruise missile...

R-27 Zyb (SS-N-6)

The R-27 Zyb (NATO designation: SS-N-6 “Serb”), was a submarine-launched, liquid-fueled ballistic missile developed and deployed by the Soviet Union. Elements of the R-27 are believed to be the basis for some of North Korea’s ballistic missile programs. R-27 Development Development of the R-27 began in 1962 and flight tests began in mid-1965. The missile was first...

RK-55 Granat (SS-N-21)

The RK-55 Granat (NATO: SS-N-21 “Sampson”) is a submarine and ground-launched intermediate range cruise missile produced by the Soviet Union since 1976. RK-55 Development The RK-55 is the submarine/ground-launched component of the “55” series of cruise missiles which also included the Kh-55 air-launched missile. This family of cruise missiles was the Soviet Union’s response to the...

RSM-56 Bulava (SS-N-32)

The RSM-56 Bulava (NATO: SS-N-32) is an intercontinental-range, submarine-launched, solid propellant ballistic missile. Alongside the SS-25 and the SS-27, both land-based ICBMs, the Bulava represents a core component of Russia’s future strategic nuclear force. Development of the program began in the 1990’s with official production contacts going into effect in the 2007-2008 timeframe. The Bulava...

R-29RM Shtil (SS-N-23)

The R-29RM Shtil (NATO: SS-N-23 “Skiff”) is an intercontinental-range, submarine-based, liquid propellant ballistic missile. The Skiff was developed for the Delta IV ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), each of which is capable of carrying 16 missiles. SS-N-23 Development The SS-N-23 is capable of launching its 2,800 kg payload up to a range of 8,300 km. This payload is...

P-800 Oniks/Yakhont/Bastion (SS-N-26 Strobile)

The SS-N-26 “Strobile” (P-800 Oniks)/Yakhont/Yakhont-M are Russian anti-ship cruise missiles developed by NPO Mashinostroyenia. There are three known variants of the missile. The ship-launched variant is known as the P-800 Oniks and has been designated the SS-N-26 “Strobile” by NATO. The export variant of the ground-launched version is known as the Yakhont. An air-launched variant...

R-29 Vysota (SS-N-18)

The R-29 Vysota (NATO: SS-N-18 “Stingray”) is an intercontinental-range, submarine-launched, liquid-propellant ballistic missile. It likely derives from the SS-N-8 (R-29) missile. The SS-N-18 was designed for the Delta III ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), or Kalmar class. Each Kalmar carries sixteen SS-N-18 missiles. SS-N-18 Development There have been three SS-N-18 variants. Mod 1 has a range...

OTR-21 Tochka (SS-21)

The OTR-21 Tochka (NATO: SS-21 “Scarab”) is a short-range, road-mobile, solid propellant, single warhead ballistic missile designed for battlefield deployment. It was designed as a replacement for the Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG) missile series. Reports suggest that it can be launched in either a ballistic or cruise missile mode. The ballistic mode provides an...

SS-1 “Scud”

The SS-1 “Scud A” was designed a short time after the end of World War II by captured German scientists and is based upon the Nazi V-2 rocket which was used to attack London during the Second World War. The Scud family of short-range, liquid-fueled missiles has now proliferated around the world and serves as...

3M-54 Kalibr/Club (SS-N-27)

The 3M-54 Kalibr/Klub (SS-N-27 “Sizzler”) is a Russian short-range ship-, and submarine-launched anti-ship missile. The Sizzler is part of the Kalibr family of missiles and has several export versions known as the ‘Klub’ missile series. SS-N-27 Development Along with the rest of the Klub and Kalibr family of missiles, this anti-ship cruise missile began development...

RSD-10 Pioneer (SS-20)

The RSD-10 Pioneer (NATO: SS-20 “Saber”) was a Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) that entered service in 1976. Its wide-scale deployment was a key driver behind NATO’s 1979 decision to station U.S. Pershing II IRBMs in Europe. The Soviet Union retired the SS-20 from service following the ratification of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty...

9K720 Iskander (SS-26)

The 9K720 Iskander (NATO: SS-26 “Stone”) is a road-mobile short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with a range of up to 500 km. Using a common transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and support vehicles, the system can also fire the 9M728 (R-500, SSC-7) and 9M729 (SSC-8) cruise missiles. Iskander Development Russia began development of the SS-26 in the late 1980s...

RS-26 Rubezh

The RS-26 Rubezh is a Russian solid-fueled, road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) currently in development. Although classified as an ICBM under the New START Treaty, the RS-26 has been tested with heavier payloads at ranges below 5,500 km, potentially putting Russia in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. RS-26 Development Development of the...

RS-28 Sarmat

The RS-28 Sarmat is a liquid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile currently under development by Russia. Sarmat Development Designed to replace Russia’s aging SS-18 Satan ICBM, the RS-28 Sarmat began development some time in the 2000s. After awarding production contracts to Makeyev Design Bureau and NPOMash in early 2011, Russia concluded research and development of the Sarmat...

RS-24 Yars (SS-27 Mod 2)

The RS-24 Yars (NATO: SS-27 Mod 2) is a three-stage solid fuel missile that reportedly carries a payload of three reentry vehicles (RV) and penetration aids. RS-24 Yars Development The RS-24 Yars is believed to have entered into service in February 2010. While details about the missiles specifications and capabilities are limited, it is reported to...

RT-2PM2 Topol-M (SS-27 Mod 1 “Sickle B”)

The RT-2PM2 “Topol-M” (NATO designation: SS-27 “Sickle B”), is a Russian solid-fueled intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,000 km. Topol-M Development The development of the Topol-M, began in the late 1980s as an upgraded version of the SS-25, though it was redesigned in 1992 as the first missile designed and built by the...

RT-2PM Topol (SS-25)

The RT-2PM Topol (SS-25 “Sickle”) is an intercontinental-range, road-mobile, solid propellant ballistic missile system. It has a range of over 11,000 km and was based on the preceding Temp-2S and Pioneer road-mobile missiles. SS-25 Development The SS-25 entered development in 1977, with flight tests occurring in between 1983-87. The missile was officially commissioned into service...

UR-100 (SS-19)

The UR-100 (NATO: SS-19 “Stiletto”) s an intercontinental-range, silo-based, liquid propellant ballistic missile system deployed by the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation. Designed concurrently with the SS-17, with which it shares many features. SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 were the first Soviet missiles to be equipped with Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle (MIRV) warheads with...

R-36 (SS-18 “Satan”)

The The R-36 (NATO: SS-18 “Satan”) is an intercontinental-range, silo-based, liquid propellant ballistic missile initially developed by the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation. It is believed that a total of six versions have existed since the program’s inception, with only the Mod 6’s still operationally deployed. SS-18 Development The SS-18 (original Mods 1/2/3)...

Kh-101 / Kh-102

The Kh-101 / Kh-102 is a line of conventional and nuclear capable air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) developed and deployed by Russia. A stealthy missile, the Kh-101/-102 is designed to defeat air defense systems by flying at low, terrain-hugging altitudes to avoid radar systems. The Kh-101 carries a conventional warhead, while the Kh-102 is believed to...

Kh-47M2 Kinzhal

The Kh-47M2 Kinzhal is a nuclear-capable, Russian air-launched ballistic missile, likely derived from Russia’s ground-launched 9K720 Iskander-M. It was one of six “next generation” weapons unveiled by President Putin during a speech in March 2018. Kinzhal Development Although it is unclear when Kinzhal’s development began, concept schemes of Russian Iskander missiles installed on the MiG-31...

Missiles of Russia

As the heir to the substantial Soviet missile arsenal, Russia boasts the widest inventory of ballistic and cruise missiles in the world. Russia remains a major power in the development of missiles of all kinds, and Russian strategic rocket forces constitute a significant element of Moscow’s military strategy. Russian missiles perform a wide variety of...

9M729 (SSC-8)

The SSC-8 is a Russian ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) with a range of 2,500 km. Its development prompted the 2019 U.S. withdrawal from the 1987 INF Treaty. SSC-8 Development Russia reportedly began covert development of the SSC-8 in the mid-2000s, and started flight testing in 2008. It was first test fired in July 2014. It...

The Avangard is a nuclear-capable, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle developed by the Russian Federation. It was one of six “next generation” weapons described by Russian President Vladimir Putin during a speech in March 2018. Avangard Development The origins of the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) reach back to the mid-1980s, at which time the USSR first started...

Ukraine is killing Russian missiles with hand-me-down air defense weapons the US retired decades ago

• Ukraine is operating US-made Hawk air-defense systems from the 1960s.
• Though the US retired these tools decades ago, Kyiv is now using them to kill Russian missiles.
• One Ukrainian operator recently praised the effectiveness of the antiquated system.

The Ukrainians are using an American-made air-defense system that the US retired from service more than two decades ago to successfully shoot down Russian cruise missiles.

The MIM-23 Hawk is a medium-range, surface-to-air system that was first fielded in the 1960s and has long been considered obsolete, with militaries favoring more portable systems. But the hand-me-down weapons have found new life in Ukraine, proving they are still useful tools after all these years.

A Ukrainian soldier who operates the Hawk system, which stands for "Homing All the Way Killer," said that although it's not a new weapon, it is "effective in skilled hands." He has more than two dozen kills to his name, including Russia's Kh-59 cruise missiles and Iranian-made Shahed one-way attack drones.

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The soldier, Oleksandr, was featured by the Ukrainian Air Force on Wednesday. In an interview , which was published to the AFU's Telegram messaging app, he said Shahed drones are the most annoying to engage because they fly very slow, so its tiring to battle them over long periods of time.

"'Working with missiles is much easier, even when they are aimed at you," Oleksandr said. "It was a little uncomfortable when three Kh-59 missiles, constantly changing altitude, flew right at us. But all the targets were captured and destroyed one by one."

"The main secret is not even in the weapon we work on, but in the synchronous and coordinated work of the unit," he said, according to a translation of his remarks. "We perfectly understand the risks and consequences if we do not hear or ignore each other."

The Hawk system was deployed all around the world during its four decades in service with the US military, and it saw combat in the Middle East. By the 1990s, though, with the Cold War over, the aerial threat to American forces had changed, and the Hawk was retired and replaced with lower-altitude systems like the FIM-92 Stinger and Avenger. The MIM-104 Patriot was also available to meet other US air-defense needs.

Though the US no longer use them, several countries still operate the Hawk and its multiple variants, including Spain, which first sent Ukraine a handful of launchers in October 2022. The Biden administration has since donated an unspecified number Hawk systems and munitions to Kyiv and has committed to procuring more for the country over the long term.

Ukrainian officials have routinely pressed the US and its NATO allies for more air-defense capabilities to battle the Russian threat. While the Hawk is an antiquated capability, it still helps plug crucial gaps in the sky.

The Hawk is not the only 1960s-era — and seemingly outdated — weapon to find successes in Ukraine. German-made Gepard cannons have also proven to be very effective at shooting down low-altitude Russian drones and cruise missiles.

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Putin says Russia may resume global deployment of intermediate range missiles

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As Moscow bureau chief, Guy runs coverage of Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Before Moscow, Guy ran Brexit coverage as London bureau chief (2012-2022). On the night of Brexit, his team delivered one of Reuters historic wins - reporting news of Brexit first to the world and the financial markets. Guy graduated from the London School of Economics and started his career as an intern at Bloomberg. He has spent over 14 years covering the former Soviet Union. He speaks fluent Russian.

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Russia’s devastating glide bombs keep falling on its own territory

Internal Russian documents show how often its glide bombs hit its own territory, likely due to faulty guidance systems, say experts.

The powerful glide-bombs that Russia has used to such great effect to pound Ukrainian cities into rubble have also been falling on its own territory, an internal Russian document has revealed.

At least 38 of the bombs, which have been credited with helping drive Russia’s recent territorial advances, crashed into the Belgorod region on the border with Ukraine between April 2023 and April 2024, according to the document obtained by The Washington Post, though most did not detonate.

Roughly comparable to the more advanced American JDAM guided bombs, these glide bombs are large Soviet-era munitions retrofitted with guidance systems that experts say often fail — resulting in impacts on Russian territory.

The majority of the bombs were discovered by civilians — forest rangers, farmers or residents of villages surrounding the city. In most cases, the Defense Ministry didn’t know when the bombs had been launched, indicating that some of them could have been there for days.

According to the document, at least four bombs fell on the city of Belgorod itself, a regional hub with a population of about 400,000 people. An additional seven were found in the surrounding suburbs. The most, 11, fell in the Graivoron border region where some could not be recovered because of the “difficult operational situation.”

The document, originally intercepted by Ukrainian intelligence and passed on to The Post, includes a spreadsheet of incidents citing emergency decrees on bomb cleanup and evacuation and appears to be a product of the Belgorod city emergency department.

Astra, an independent Russian media outlet , verified that many of the incidents in the document matched those it had collected from local governments and reports in local news media. People mentioned as witnesses have been confirmed as residents.

While the bombs usually fail to detonate, one of the first recorded hitting Belgorod in April 2023 did explode when it crashed into a normally busy street, creating a crater 65 feet wide, shattering windows, and hurling parked cars onto roofs of buildings. The impact happened at night, however, and no casualties were reported. A day later a second, unexploded bomb was found buried 23 feet into the ground.

Russian military acknowledged at the time that the “accidental release of aircraft munition” from a Russian Su-34 fighter-bomber was behind the explosion. The document later confirmed it was FAB-500, a glide bomb, carrying a 500-kilogram, or 1,100-pound, payload.

Local authorities generally remain quiet about the incidents, only reporting “accidents,” blaming Ukrainian shelling or just not reporting the various explosions rattling the area, particularly more recently.

On May 4 — after the period covered by the document — another bomb fell on Belgorod, injuring seven people and damaging more than 30 houses in a small community. Citing a source in the emergency services, the Astra media outlet reported it was also a FAB-500.

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Gov. Vyacheslav Gladkov said only that “an explosion happened.”

“The governor always reports what exactly caused the explosion, but this time he decided not to disclose it,” independent local outlet Pepel noted at the time. “This indirectly confirms that the explosion was caused by a Russian air bomb that fell on the house during the bombing. The nature of the destruction also indicates this.”

On May 12, another blast destroyed several stories of an apartment block in Belgorod, killing 17 people. The Russian military blamed a Ukrainian missile, while the Conflict Intelligence Team, a Russian research group specializing in open-source investigations, said video from the scene indicated it was the result of another accidental FAB-500 bombing or a rogue antiaircraft missile fired by a Russian defense system.

On June 15, an explosion took place in the town of Shebekino, near Belgorod, and part of a five-story building collapsed, killing at least five, likely another glide bomb mishap.

According to its own tallies, Astra estimated that Russia has accidentally dropped more than a hundred bombs on its own territory as well as occupied areas in eastern Ukraine over the past four months — the same period that has seen a major increase in the use of glide bombs.

The Russian government has not responded to a request for comment on the document or reports of failed glide bombs.

The glide bombs are a Soviet relic hailing from the Cold War, designed as “dumb bombs” to be dropped on a target. Russia adapted this large inventory of unguided bombs to modern warfare by retrofitting them with guidance systems known as UMPK kits — cheap pop-out wings and navigation systems.

This allows Russian Su-34 and Su-35 jets to launch them from a distance of about 40 miles, which is out of reach for most Ukrainian air defense systems.

“A certain percentage of Russian bombs is defective. This problem has existed since they started using these UMPK kits and it’s not being fundamentally solved. We think these accidental releases are caused by the unreliability of these kits, something that does not seem to bother the Air Force,” Ruslan Leviev, a military expert with the Conflict Intelligence Group that has been tracking Russian military activities in Ukraine since 2014, said in a recent front line update.

“According to our estimates, only a fraction of these bombs fail, so it doesn’t affect the practical effectiveness of this weapon, no matter how cynical that may sound,” Leviev said. “Unlike Western high-precision bombs, the UMPK kits are produced relatively cheaply and in large quantities, using civilian electronics, where reliability requirements are much lower.”

Based on statements from the Ukrainians about the numbers of bombs launched and the tallies from Astra about misfires, the CIT estimated a failure rate of 4 to 6 percent.

“Under normal conditions, such a system would need to be improved, at a minimum, to avoid falls on populated areas on our territory, which we have already seen and which also led to casualties,” the group said to The Post in response to queries on the misfires. “We don’t know whether the Russian Federation is currently spending resources on this. Perhaps they are quite happy with this situation.”

The fact that most of the bombs whose guidance systems fail and fall on Russian territory don’t detonate suggests there is some kind of fail-safe system to keep them from exploding in such cases, the CIT added.

Glide bombs are also not as precise as cruise missiles, and often miss the target, but because of sheer explosive power they still do significant damage.

The glide bombs have put added pressure on Ukraine’s ground-based air defenses and have been instrumental in Russia’s demolition of Avdiivka , which its troops conquered in mid-February, marking its most significant gain since the capture of Bakhmut a year ago.

“Those weapons allow Russia to supplement an inadequate inventory of tactical air-launched missiles and to avoid using free-fall bombs that expose pilots to a greater risk of being shot down,” according to recent analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Ukraine’s best defense against them is the U.S. Patriot surface-to-air missile that can destroy a Russian aircraft before it approaches to release the bomb, but the systems are in short supply.

In late March, the Defense Ministry announced the development of a new, heavier version of the glide bomb, the FAB-3000, weighing twice as much as the next-biggest model. The number corresponds to the weight in kilograms, making it more than 6,000 pounds. It was finally deployed June 21 against the Ukrainian village of Liptsy .

The ministry also said the production of the lighter FAB-500 and FAB-1500 had been drastically increased.

The misfires for the enormous new FAB-3000s are already being reported. On June 29 one crashed into an empty field near Shebekino and exploded, but there were no casualties, according to Astra .

Number of injured increased again due to falling debris from Russian missile in Kyiv

I n Kyiv, according to updated reports, the number of casualties from today's Russian missile attack and the debris falling from enemy targets has risen to 6 people. Previously, it was known about five injured, reports Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko.

According to Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko, medics reported that among those injured in the building in the Obolonsky district hit by missile debris:

・an 11-year-old girl,

" One elderly woman was hospitalized . All others received assistance on the spot," he added.

The mayor clarified that all the injured individuals have acute stress reactions .

Russian missile strike on Kyiv on June 30

Earlier, it was reported that on Sunday evening in Kyiv and northern regions, an air alert was declared due to missile threats. Subsequently, the Air Force Command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine warned of a potentially cruise missile flying towards the capital. Later, Kyiv authorities announced the operation of air defense in the Kyiv region.

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko later disclosed that emergency services were dispatched to the Obolon district where debris from a downed missile damaged a multi-story building. Initially, two casualties were reported.

In the Kyiv region police, it was reported that debris from the missile fall in one of the settlements of the region caused casualties and damaged buildings.

The Head of the Kyiv Regional Military Administration, Serhii Popko, stated that today's Russian attack on Kyiv was aimed at reconnaissance of methods and means to strike the capital.