coastal defense cruise missile

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Securing the shoreline – why coastal defence is back on the agenda

9th February 2024 - 01:02 GMT | by Christopher F Foss

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Events such as the sinking of the Russian cruiser Moskva by Ukraine in April 2022 using a Neptune missile system have highlighted the increasing emphasis placed on coastal defence by several countries, especially in Europe.

In most Western countries coastal artillery disappeared many years ago (in the 1950s in the UK and US) but Nordic nations such as Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden maintained their defences until the end of the Cold War...  Continues below

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Above:  A Ukrainian R-360 Neptune anti-ship missile just after launch, showing the booster which falls away after the main turbojet engine cuts in. (Photo: Ukrainian MoD)

These were a mix of static turret guns such as the 120mm Bofors ERSTA deployed by Norway and Sweden, mobile artillery and missiles.

But today an increasing number of countries are looking at expanding their coastal long-range fires capability, mainly with highly mobile surface-to-surface missiles.

Given its success in combat, Ukraine’s R-360 Neptune system can be seen as an exemplar of this technology. The missile, which can also be air-launched, was developed by the Luch design bureau.

According to the prime contractor, a typical Neptune coastal defence battery would consist of a mobile command post, 48 missiles, four self-propelled launchers each with four rounds, four loading vehicles, four transport vehicles and a set of ground support equipment.

All units are based on an 8x8 or 6x6 wheeled platform for strategic mobility, with claimed maximum road speeds of 70km/h.

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The 420mm diameter solid propellant missile has a maximum firing range of 300km and uses a nose-mounted active radar seeker with up to eight waypoints to make detection more difficult.

Soon after the missile leaves the launcher the booster falls away and the main engine cuts in; in the terminal phase the missile is only three to ten metres above the waves.

Launchers can be located up to 25km from the coast with targets detected by air (including UAVs), satellites and land- or sea-based radar.

The number of missiles launched depends on the target, with two hitting the Moskva , inflicting heavy damage that caused it to later sink whilst under tow.

The four launchers can fire a salvo of 16 missiles at the same time against well-defended targets to overcome the ship’s countermeasures, with the interval between salvoes being three to five seconds.

Once the fire mission is complete, the launchers and associated vehicles would move to be reloaded and avoid detection.

On top of this domestic capability, the US also recently agreed to supply Ukraine with two batteries of Boeing Harpoon missiles for the coastal defence role.

This US system is also finding favour in another potential flashpoint, Taiwan, with the US approving the sale to Taipei of a coastal defence system based on the latest Harpoon model which includes 100 launchers, 400 Block II missiles and training equipment.

In Turkey, Roketsan has developed the Atmaca anti-ship missile as a replacement for the country’s US-supplied Harpoons and a coastal defence vehicle model is being marketed. Atmaca has a range of at least 220km with a 220kg warhead.

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China meanwhile has developed a gun-based technology for this role, with NORINCO marketing a ‘155mm Coast Defence Weapon System’ typically consisting of three batteries each with six 45 or 52cal towed howitzers and supporting radar, command and observation posts.

Maximum range depends on the projectile and charge but firing an extended-range full-bore – base bleed (ERFB-BB) rocket-assisted projectile from a 52cal system is effective at up to 51km. In addition laser-guided artillery rounds can be used for precision effect.

Back in Europe, Spain offers an equivalent with a version of the General Dynamics European Land Systems-Santa Barbara Sistemas 155mm 155/52 APU SBT howitzer optimised for the coastal defence mission, and coupled to a command post and associated radar.

When firing a standard M107 HE projectile the maximum range is 18km but this can be extended to 41km using an ERFB BB projectile.

The Russian Navy’s equivalent is the A-222 Bereg 130mm mobile coastal artillery system, offered for export as the Bereg-E.

Above:  The three main elements of the Russian A-22 2 Bereg 130mm coastal artillery system are seen here: the MOBD combat support vehicle, CPU C2 post and SAU fire unit. (Photo: Rosoboronexport)

All elements are based on the MAZ-543M 8x8 truck chassis which has a high level of cross-country mobility. As these are no longer built a new platform would be needed for any future production. A complete Bereg system would typically consist of one C2 vehicle (CPU), one combat support vehicle (MOBD) and up to six fire units (SAU).

The SAUs are fitted with a turret-mounted 130mm gun which is also found aboard some Russian naval vessels and fires the same types of ammunition out to a maximum range of 22km with a maximum rate of fire 12 rounds a minute.

While Sweden disbanded its coastal artillery arm years ago, it did retain some Saab RBS 15 missiles installed on Scania 6x6 trucks as well as launchers for the US Hellfire optimised for the coastal defence mission. These laser-guided Hellfires have the Swedish designation RBS 17 and are fitted with a locally designed blast fragmentation warhead.

In addition to Sweden, Croatia and Finland also use the RBS 15 for coastal defence. The 6x6 truck platform normally has four missiles in canisters which are elevated prior to launch.

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According to Saab, the system is designed to provide a high degree of commonality between ship- and land-based installations, which means that missiles and other hardware can be shared and used across different platforms.

The current production missile is the RBS 15 Mk 3, available off the shelf with a maximum range of around 200km. A key feature of the wider RBS 15 system is that it is modular and extendable, allowing a customer to scale and adapt coverage by launchers, radars and command posts to match new threat profiles.

Development of the next-generation RBS 15, the Mk 4 Gungnir, is ongoing, with a commitment to compatibility, enabling a smooth transmission for operators of the Mk 3.

Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile (NSM), normally ship-launched, also forms the basis of the Coastal Defence System (CDS) marketed by the Norwegian company. This has already been exported, first to Poland and more recently to Romania and Latvia via the US FMS system.

The core of the NSM CDS is the Fire Control Centre (FCC) which also provides battle management C4I. This leverages the Fire Direction Centre used in Kongsberg’s NASAMS air defence missile system, with over 120 units already delivered.

The CDS’s launcher is typically on a 8x8 or 6x6 truck, which can have a protected cab, with four NSMs deployed in canisters on the rear of the vehicle. The final element is a sea surveillance and tracking radar which would normally be selected by the customer.

Above:  A Polish Kongsberg NSM Coastal Defence System launcher based on a Jelcz 6x6 chassis with protected cab fires one of its Naval Strike Missiles. (Photo: Kongsberg)

The NSM CDS was deployed by the Polish Navy following contracts signed in 2008 and 2011 covering 50 missiles. This system has been operational for over 12 years and its launchers are based on the local Jelcz 6x6 truck, alongside TRS-15C radars, fire control and command vehicles. A second batch of missiles and launchers has been ordered.

More recently, the NSM was selected by the USMC as part of the Navy Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS). The launcher for this application is a remotely controlled Oshkosh Joint Light Tactical Vehicle carrying two missiles.

In search of further opportunities, Kongsberg has teamed with Thales Australia to offer the StrikeMaster fire team concept to meet Canberra’s Land 4100 Phase 2 land-based anti-ship system requirement.

All vehicle elements would be based on the Thales Australia Bushmaster 4x4 which is already in service with Australia and other operators. The FCC proposed is similar to that used with NASAMS by the Australian Army.

One point in this bid’s favour is that the NSM has already been chosen for Royal Australian Navy ships. According to Kongsberg, ‘the NSM system is unsurpassed in the expected denied environment of the future and can be transferred between trucks and ships if need be’.

Also competing in this space is MBDA with the Marte Coastal Defence System (MCDS) which uses the Marte Mk 2/N or Marte Extended Range (ER) missiles.

There would typically be four launcher trucks with four missiles each (or the missiles can be fired from a pallet on jacks), plus a containerised C2 centre and a logistics module.

The current Marte Mk 2/N is supersonic and has a semi-armour-piercing HE warhead fitted with impact and proximity fuzes with a maximum range of around 30km. The more recent ER has a maximum range of over 100km and is guided using mid-course inertial navigation via waypoints and an active radar-homing terminal phase.

The first customer for the MCSD is Qatar which has also ordered the latest Exocet MM40 Block III.

Another contender for coastal defence contracts is the Blue Spear missile developed by Proteus Advanced Systems, a JV between Israel’s IAI and ST Engineering to meet the requirements of the Republic of Singapore Navy.

A land-based version has been evolved and in October 2021 the Estonian Centre for Defence Investment signed a contract with Proteus to supply Blue Spear for the coastal defence role.

Blue Spear has a range of at least 290km at a subsonic speed of Mach 0.85. It has both fire-and-forget and fire-and-update modes of operation with a low-level sea-skimming capability.

Russia has also used missiles for the coastal defence mission for many years, with some of these being exported.

The older 4K51 Rubezh (maximum range 80km) and P-35B Redut (270km) land-based anti-ship missiles have been replaced in the Russian Navy by the more capable K-300P Bastion P and 3K60 Bal.

Bastion-P is transported and launched from an 8x8 platform and vertically launches two P-800 Oniks missiles which have a solid propellant engine and a ramjet for supersonic capability.

Maximum range is quoted as 300km and the Oniks uses an active radar seeker, IR imaging seeker and a 200/250kg warhead. In addition there is a static version called Bastion-S.

The 3K60 Bal is also based on an MZKT-7930 8x8 platform and carries eight 3M-24 subsonic missiles in two layers of four. These have a maximum range of up to 120km with a semi-armour-piercing warhead. More recently an improved version has been fielded with greater range and is used in conjunction with satellite guidance.

A typical battery would comprise a command vehicle, two launcher vehicles and two resupply vehicles.

These Russian systems have their own C2 elements and radars but would normally be linked into a wider overall network with other assets.

Aside from guns and missiles, artillery rocket systems are also deployed by some countries in the coastal defence role.

Brazil’s Avibras has developed a mission-specific version of the Astros II multiple rocket launcher, while the UAE deploys the Jobaria Defense Systems 122mm Multiple Cradle Launcher in the anti-amphibious landing role.

This can be fitted with pods of Roketsan 122mm or 300mm unguided rockets which would be salvo-fired against incoming landing craft.

Above:   Th e Avibras Astros II is one of a relatively small number of artillery rocket systems offered specifically for the coastal defence role. (Photo: Avibras)

It is evident then, that in actual and potential flashpoints around the world, from the Baltic to the Red Sea to the Taiwan Strait, an increasing number of missile, howitzer and rocket technologies are being adapted and deployed to deter and defeat naval threats. Whether this represents a once-in-a-generation replenishment or addition of defences, or if this focus will continue in the longer term, will largely depend on geopolitical shifts and the course of conflicts.

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Coastal Defence Missile Systems – A ground-based anti-access/area denial, anti-ship capability

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Raytheon Wins $209 Million Contract For Romanian NSM Coastal Defense System

• Defense Watch: USSF-67, Drone Supply Chain, F-15EX Air-to-Air, SNA Week
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Naval Sea Systems Command recently awarded Raytheon Technologies [RTX] a $209 million Foreign Military Sales contract for a Naval Strike Missile (NSM) Coastal Defense System for Romania.

The contract was awarded on Dec. 22 but the Defense Department announced the order on Jan. 5.

The contract includes options that, if exercised, would raise the total value to over $217 million.

The NSM is billed as a long-range precision anti-ship cruise missile that can hit enemy ships at up to 100 nautical miles away while flying at sea-skimming altitudes to avoid detection. The missile was originally developed by Norway’s Kongsberg , which is now working with Raytheon to integrate an Over The Horizon (OTH) capability for U.S. Navy purposes.

Work is set to be split among Kongsberg, Norway (60 percent); Tucson, Ariz. (34 percent); Schrobenhausen, Germany (two percent); Raufoss, Norway (one percent); and various locations each less than one percent (three percent). The work is expected to be finished by September 2028.

This award comes over two years after the State Department approved a $300 million FMS sale to Romania for the NSM Coastal Defense System, in October 2020 ( Defense Daily , Oct. 16, 2020). 

That approval also covered up to 10 Link-16 Multifunctional Information Distribution System – Joint Tactical Radio Systems, two Coastal Defense System Fire Distribution Centers; four Mobile Launch Vehicles; Transport Loading Vehicles; and an undisclosed amount of Naval Strike Missiles.

At the time, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency said Romania would use this system to improve its Black Sea maritime defense capabilities and interoperability with the U.S.

In 2015, Kongsberg and Raytheon announced a teaming agreement to cooperate on the Naval Strike Missile ( Defense Daily , April 8, 2015).

This contract was not competitively procured in accordance with U.S. Code regulations related to an international agreement. 

Beyond the U.S. and now Romania, other buyers of the NSM include Australia, Canada, Germany, Malaysia, Poland, Spain and the U.K.

The U.K. recently announced it will outfit 11 Type 23 frigates and Type 45 destroyers with Naval Strike Missiles starting in 2023 ( Defense Daily , Nov. 29).

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Russia’s coastal defence systems: supporting limited naval capabilities

Home to a large and unmanageable coastline and a navy that is relatively limited in its capabilities, Russia relies on an array of coastal defence missiles. Samuel Cranny-Evans explores the country’s coastal defence strategy and capabilities.

With a coastline of 37,653km, Russia has never been able to adequately police or control its maritime borders. The collapse of the Soviet Union meant that Russia lost much of its navy, as well as access to ports that could be used year-round. Nonetheless, Moscow sought to maintain its naval ambitions, investing in the Admiral Kutznetsov aircraft carrier as well as modernising its fleet to carry 3M-54 series Kalibr cruise missiles.

To compensate for any shortfall in its naval capabilities, Russia has modernised and developed its coastal defence missile systems.

Russia’s primary coastal defence missiles

The K-300P Bastion-P (SSC-5 “Stooge”) and the 3K60 Bal (SSC-6 “Sennight”) are the primary coastal defence missile systems used by the Russian naval forces. They are designed to provide stand-off precision strike capabilities against surface vessels and raise the potential costs of a naval power attempting to get within striking range of Russian territory. They replaced Soviet era systems such as the 4K511 Rubezh (SSC-3 “Styx”, not to be confused with the Rubezh ICBM) and P-35B Redut (SSC-1 “Sepal”) anti-ship missiles with ranges between 80km and 270 km.

Whilst primarily involved in engaging naval targets, the Bastion-P has also been used to engage land targets in Syria.

Bastion-P is designed to fire the P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missile, which has a range of 300km and is powered by a solid propellant with a ramjet. It reaches a top speed of 750m/s and descends to an altitude of 10-15m in its terminal phase to avoid detection. Guidance is provided by an active radar and infrared imaging seeker. The seeker is reportedly capable of selecting a target, even from a group of vessels and against jamming.

It carries a 200kg or 250kg warhead depending on mission and can be launched from a mobile launcher (Bastion-P) or a stationary launcher (Bastion-S). Each mobile launcher carries two Oniks missiles that are launched from a vertical position.

Bastion-P is designed to fire the P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missile, which has a range of 300km and is powered by a solid propellant with a ramjet.

The 3K60 Bal is another mobile system, designed to fire the 3M-24 anti-ship cruise missile, a Soviet-era design. It is a subsonic cruise missile powered by a turbofan with a cruise speed of 27 m/s and a range of 120km. It is armed with a 145kg semi-armour piercing warhead and can cruise at a height of 10-15m, dropping to 1.5m for its terminal phase.

A later version of the missile had its range extended to 260km and guidance is provided via a satellite datalink with active radar for the seeker in the terminal phase. Eight missiles are carried by a 3K60 launch vehicle; there are two launch vehicles in a battery and two batteries in a coastal defence unit. They are often accompanied by a battery or more of K-300Ps, which consists of two launch vehicles, with four launch vehicles in a battalion.

// The K-300P Bastion-P is designed to fire the P-800 Oniks anti-ship cruise missile. Credit: Mil.ru

Challenges for defending vessels

The two missiles have very different speeds and flight profiles: Whilst supersonic flight represents challenges in its speed, the missiles also tend to fly higher than subsonic alternatives, especially if fired at longer ranges.

This increased altitude can provide ships with greater detection time and improve their detection range – which can be as much as 50 nautical miles (nm), according to Dr Sidharth Kaushal, sea power research fellow at RUSI. A missile at a sea-skimming altitude, like the 3M-24’s 10m for instance, may only be detected at a range of 20nm. Detection at this range would give a ship around two minute’s warning for a subsonic missile.

Together, the 3K60 Bal and K-300P Bastion-P present several challenges to defending vessels.

Together, the 3K60 Bal and K-300P Bastion-P present several challenges to defending vessels: As the speeds of the missiles differ, a ship must be able to prioritise its engagement of incoming missiles – some that may be supersonic – and possibly reserve capacity to engage a large quantity of subsonic missiles. The dual-mode seeker of the P-800 Oniks missile also raises challenges for soft-kill solutions, Dr Kaushal wrote in February.

Targeting is provided by a mix of land, air and sea assets; however, it is unclear how capable Russian forces are in coordinating data gathered by these dispersed systems.

Ground-based target detection can be provided by the organic targeting systems assigned to the missile batteries; additional over-the-horizon (OTH) detection can be provided by the Monolit-BR coastal defence radar. Each Monolit-BR complex consists of two radar vehicles that can conduct passive and active target tracking. It is reported to be capable of receiving OTH data from other assets such as the Mineral-ME radar fitted to Russia’s Sovremenny-class destroyers. Additional cues can be received from the Ka-31 helicopter or long-range big wing assets such as the Il-38N.

Engagements beyond Russia’s coast

Michael Kofman, research program director in the Russia Studies Program at think thank CNA, wrote in January 2020 that coastal defence missiles were “somewhere between plan C or plan D in order of echelonment for dealing with a blue water navy.” He adds that most of the counter to this kind of threat is provided by forward deployed ships, land-based aircraft with anti-ship missiles and then mining before coastal defence systems come into play.

Nevertheless, these systems are emblematic of Russia’s drive to modernise the ability of its forces to conduct long-range, stand-off engagements. It has demonstrated its willingness to conduct missile strikes in Ukraine and engaged stationary critical infrastructure with hundreds of land and maritime cruise missiles.

It follows that the coastal defence systems would play a role in engaging an opponent’s shipping and its naval vessels if they can be brought within reach. Russia’s tendency to deploy its coastal defence systems to islands such as disputed elements of the Kuril Island chain or onto ice flows in the Arctic also suggest that the systems may be found further beyond Russia’s coast, extending their engagement ranges into unexpected areas.

If nothing else, finding and engaging these assets will add to the targeting burden of any force involved in a conflict with Russia.

// Main image: Russian K-300P Bastion-P coastal defence missile system. Credit:  Mil.ru

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Pentagon plan for homeland cruise missile defense taking shape

WASHINGTON — The Pentagon’s plan to defend the U.S. homeland from cruise missiles is starting to take shape after a prolonged period of development because until recently , the threat was perceived as a more distant regional one, a senior Air Force official said.

North American Aerospace Defense Command and U.S. Northern Command have been working for several years and across two presidential administrations to come up with a design that can effectively defend the continental U.S. from cruise missiles, according to Brig. Gen. Paul Murray, NORAD deputy director of operations.

NORAD and NORTHCOM, in consultation with the Missile Defense Agency and the Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense Organization are closing in on a design framework for the mission, Murray said, just as the Pentagon enters a critical decision-making period as it formulates the fiscal 2024 budget request.

Once the design is created, “it’s time to go out and defend the design,” Murray said at a Center for Strategic and International Studies conference July 14. This translates to conducting modeling and simulation to prove out, in part, that the architecture will work.

It’s also not to say “my computer’s crunching numbers, buy me these capabilities,” he said, adding capabilities need to be demonstrated which includes partnering with the MDA and others to experiment.

Budgets for cruise missile defense of the homeland in fiscal 2022 and 2023 were modest, with combatant commands including NORTHCOM placing additional funding for development in so-called wish lists rather than in base budget requests and hoping that Congress ultimately supplies the dollars.

The cruise missile challenge

Land-attack cruise missiles can be launched from the air, ground or sea and because they fly at low altitudes under powered flight, it is difficult for radars to detect them.

Ballistic missiles can be detected much earlier, which allows more time to detect, track, decide and act. For cruise missiles, decision makers may have only a couple of minutes and salvos of cruise missiles can attack from different directions, complicating the approach to defeating the threat.

While the U.S. has been focused on ballistic missile defense of the homeland from adversaries including North Korea, Russia and China have made investments over several decades to develop cruise missiles capable of carrying out a non-nuclear attack.

The 2019 Missile Defense Review highlighted the need to focus on near-peer cruise missiles and directed the Pentagon to recommend an organization to have acquisition authority of cruise missile defense for the homeland. The designation requirement also appeared in the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, but the Pentagon has yet to choose what organization will be in charge of the effort.

The lack of an acquisition authority can hamper the budget process. And budget requests during the Trump administration contained little to get moving on cruise missile defense. In President Joe Biden’s first two budgets, the mission also received very little funding save to conduct a cruise missile defense kill chain demonstration.

Previous attempts to figure out how to defend against cruise missiles hit roadblocks.

In 2015, for example, a large aerostat being evaluated for cruise missile defense at Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland broke free from its mooring and drifted across Pennsylvania. It’s long tether knocked out power lines and, once it landed in a grove of trees in Amish countryside, had to be shot at by State Troopers to get it to deflate.

The JLENS program was promptly canceled .

The debate over what part of the U.S. is most important to protect from cruise missiles also hindered progress because it was difficult to land on policy to help determine site locations, Peppi DeBiaso, a non-resident senior associate at CSIS, said during a panel discussion at the conference.

Impossible to protect everything

CSIS, in a report it debuted at the conference , said it will be impossible to protect everything. Lt. Gen. A.C. Roper, U.S. NORTHCOM deputy commander, said in a recording played at the event, that “placing a Patriot or a [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense] battery on every street corner is both infeasible and unaffordable.”

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The CSIS report lays out a suggested architecture, implementation plan and cost estimate for a cruise missile defense capability to protect the homeland that uses systems already fielded today and leverages sensors and radars already working other jobs to provide early warning and information to aid detection and then decision making in the event of a cruise missile attack.

The design in the CSIS report consists of five layers implemented over three phases. The elements include over-the-horizon radars, towered sensors, an aerostat, three types of interceptors, command-and-control operations centers and a mobile airborne asset, all with a projected acquisition cost of $14.9 billion. Phased operations and sustainment costs are estimated to be $17.8 billion – or $32.7 billion over 20 years.

A study from the Congressional Budget Office in 2021 developed four architectures with 20-year acquisition and sustainment costs estimated between $77 billion and $466 billion. CSIS said the architecture designs from CBO were “hampered by methodological constraints and by element selection, resulting in brittle and expensive solutions.”

The authors of the report acknowledged that “no weapon system is perfect, and perfection is the enemy of the good,” but added, “even if limited and imperfect, a sufficient and affordable defense can complicate adversary planning and strengthen deterrence.”

Vista Rampart and beyond

NORAD and NORTHCOM held a wargame called Vista Rampart in March and April to further refine cruise missile defense concepts. Then NORAD took the design outside of the headquarters to the Globally Integrated War Game, which addressed the capabilities at a broader level with the services and combatant commands.

Other considerations will need to be made, Murray added, to include how to organize, train and equip the defensive systems.

How the architecture would tie into a broader defensive framework with allies and partners such as Canada will require further coordination and analysis. The U.S. and Canada are extensively partnered through a binational command, with capabilities including the North Warning System at the edge of the Arctic designed to detect airborne threats coming from the polar region.

The Pentagon is also keeping a close eye on how the establishment of a missile defense capability on Guam will inform a homeland cruise missile defense capability. The Missile Defense Agency revealed a relatively detailed plan for defending the island against ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missile attacks as well as other airborne threats and funded the initial development and fielding in the coming years to build it.

“I think as we develop a Guam architecture, working with the Army, working with the Navy, working with the joint staff and the services, I think we will learn a lot from that, how we want to operate that integrated kind of defense” Stan Stafira, Missile Defense Agency chief architect, said at the conference. “And then that area is kind of the size of what you’re looking at trying to defend, say, a limited area in CONUS,” he said.

Last fall the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved an Integrated Air and Missile Defense priority requirements document through a portfolio management review process, Col. Tony Behrens, JIAMDO deputy director, said on the same panel.

“This process will enable a flexible and holistic approach to determining and prioritizing IAMD requirements. It established a priority framework that the combatant commands and Joint Force will help us review annually in developing what we’re calling the Integrated Air Missile Defense portfolio priority list, a holistic approach to the entire IAMD enterprise,” Behrens said.

The list is intended to aid senior decision makers balance budgetary needs and synchronize support across the services and DOD in support of missions like air and cruise missile defense of the homeland, he said.

As the Pentagon looks at cruise missile defense capability “there is a lot of capability out there,” Stafira said, “and all of the services have developed capabilities to defend against cruise missiles.”

Yet as the Defense Department looks at all of these capabilities it is going to need help from industry to answer, “how do you integrate different industry partners’ assets together to do that?”

Jen Judson is an award-winning journalist covering land warfare for Defense News. She has also worked for Politico and Inside Defense. She holds a Master of Science degree in journalism from Boston University and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Kenyon College.

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Polish coastal defence system with NSM missiles for Ukraine?

Local media reports in poland are reporting that talks are underway between warsaw and kyiv regarding the transfer of nsm missile coastal defence system (cds) components belonging to the polish navy's maritime missile unit (mjr – morska jednostka rakietowa)..

Tomasz Grotnik 30 Jun 2023

Polish defence media Defence24 broke the story, For now, it is not known which elements of the system are expected to go to Ukraine. Unofficially, it is said that it could be one battery (three self-propelled launchers MLV meaning 12 NSMs in total) or even an entire squadron (two batteries, 24 NSMs). The batteries in the Polish configuration include:

• A single BCV – Battery Command Vehicle,
• Three MLV – Missile Launch Vehicles
• A single MCC – Mobile Communication Center
• A single MRV – Mobile Radar Vehicle with TRS-15C Odra-C 3D radars. These are used to visualize the air situation and conduct surveillance in the coastal area.

The project concerns the first batch of equipment purchased from Norway by Poland in 2009 (operational status as of June 2013). Funding for the project would come from European Union, or Ukrainian funds. If this happens, Ukraine will have a second Western cruise missile system, after the MBDA Storm Shadow/Scalp EG airborne missiles.

The Polish CDS fires the Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace NSM (Naval Strike Missile) Block 1 missiles. They use a jet propulsion that provides high subsonic speed and a range of “over 200 km”. The NSM travels at a very low altitude along a pre-programmed route with turning points. To the target, the missile goes according to the indications of the inertial navigation system and GPS corrections, while during the target acquisition and attack phase, the guiding system uses an IR camera to identify the object of attack. The NSM can destroy surface ships and land targets with a known location. The biggest disadvantage of the missile is the relatively low weight of the warhead (about 120-130 kg). Nevertheless, it can effectively strike “soft” surface targets.

With Polish NSMs, Ukraine could effectively attack ships in the Black Sea. For this purpose Kyiv has the RK-360MC Neptune system (which was reportedly used to sink the Russian missile cruiser Moskva ) and Boeing Harpoon missiles received from Denmark. In both cases the actual status of these systems is not known (Ukraine could be out of Neptune missiles and the Harpoon missiles could have been destroyed in their warehouse by Russian strikes).

Compared to the two aforementioned anti-ship missiles, NSMs are more versatile, and Ukraine could also use them to attack fixed targets – moored ships, warehouses, fuel and ammunition depots – in the Sevastopol area. This would allow diversifying the use of Western cruise missiles and save Storm Shadow/Scalp EGs fired from Su-24 bomber aircraft for targets requiring a heavier warhead.

Poland was the first foreign user of the NSM and the first in the coastal defence variant. Currently, similar solutions have been purchased by the US, Romania and Latvia. The CDS is highly mobile, which was confirmed by MJR’s trips abroad (firing in the US and Norway, and exercises in Estonia, Romania), where they arrived by various means: by An-124 Ruslan aircraft, or by landing ship, and independently.

If the sale of elements of the Polish CDS to Ukraine takes place, its potential will be depleted. But this will happen for a short time, as a decision has already been made to purchase a third squadron. It will utilize the new NSM Block 1A (featuring a range of more than 250 km and a modified guidance system), command vehicles will receive new multifunction consoles (derived from the Type 212CD submarine consoles made by the KTA Naval Systems), new C2 and other modifications.

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Ice Curtain: Protecting the Arctic Motherland

Table of Contents

Brief by Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. , Heather A. Conley, and Matthew Melino

Published March 25, 2020

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'The Ice Curtain: Bringing Transparency to the Arctic is an ongoing collaborative series between the CSIS Europe Program and NGA.

In the past, Russian bases were closed to outside observers, but the Russian government appears eager to show the international community its modern air defense infrastructure and capabilities prior to Russia’s annual International Arctic Forum . In addition to Temp Airbase, Kotelny is equipped with a state-of-the-art trefoil military compound; communications and Sopka-2 radar facilities; and pads for radar, command and control, and missile launch vehicles. Kotelny is a central element in Russia’s growing network of Arctic islands that create a protective dome around its coastline and includes key outposts, such as Wrangel Island. Along with active Russian sub-surface vessels, new anti- air and anti-ship capabilities on Kotelny represent a robust anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) bubble in the Arctic, which could limit the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. air and maritime capabilities in the region.

INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, Moscow maintained a military observation post and radar station on Kotelny but it, along with other derelict Arctic outposts, was largely abandoned after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. But in 2013, the Russian Defense Ministry announced that it was redeveloping Kotelny Island as part of a larger effort to reestablish a regular naval presence in the Arctic. Increased maritime patrols would safeguard Russia’s territorial waters and extensive Arctic coastline, protect mineral and energy resources, and monitor shipping along the Northern Sea Route. Principal among these naval assets is its Northern Fleet, the Kremlin’s most visible and powerful fleet in the Arctic, which includes its sea- based nuclear deterrent and sub-surface vessels that now increasingly patrol the region and more specifically the North Atlantic.

The Kremlin has also enhanced its naval aviation assets in the region and is actively exercising its new Arctic capabilities, flying over 100 Arctic sorties in 2018 of reconnaissance, maritime patrol, and anti-submarine aircraft. The Northern Fleet’s air and air defense units engaged in 2,700 firing exercises including 51 missile launches in 2017, and 148 exercises in 2018 accompanied by 157 rocket launches. These exercises increasingly rehearse Russia’s complex and combined operations while testing its ability to mobilize rapidly to defend its Arctic coastline. It is for these reasons that Russia’s growing toolkit of integrated air and missile defense assets in the Arctic to include the deployment of the Bastion-P coastal defense system equipped with supersonic P-800 Oniks/Yakhont anti-ship cruise missiles must be assessed for its defense implications to the United States and NATO.

The 15 satellite images examined between 2013-2019, show a concerted program was undertaken since 2014 to construct at least eight—and potentially as many as eleven—specialized weapons pads along the Kotelny coastline and at Temp Airbase. These weapons pads are used by radar, command and control and missile launch vehicles and are uniquely pyramidal in shape, elevated above the tundra for drainage and stability. These pads vary in size and are now being used to support the Bastion-P coastal defense missile system and other air and coastal defense missile systems. Only those satellite images dating from September 2018 show direct evidence of the deployment of the Bastion-P on Kotelny Island, which corroborates Russian reporting of the system’s delivery to the island at that time. This construction effort indicates a logical and well- planned Russian project over the past five years to develop air and maritime defenses on an important Arctic island base.

WHY THE KOTELNY BASTION-P DEPLOYMENT IS IMPORTANT

A major upgrade to Russian Arctic coastal defense capabilities (on Kotelny and by extension the Northern Fleet) occurred during 2018 when at least a battery-sized unit of K-300P Bastion-P (NATO reporting name SS-C-5 Stooge) coastal defense missiles was deployed to Kotelny by sea. 1 The Bastion-P system is a modern coastal defense missile system that employs the supersonic P-800 Oniks/Yakhont (NATO reporting name SS-N-26 Strobile) anti-ship cruise missile. The P-800 has a maximum range of 300 km and is significantly more modern and more capable than the older 4K51 Rubezh system (NATO reporting name SSC-3 Styx), a longer-range dedicated coastal defense cruise missile system. 2

Two Bastion-P TELs subsequently took part in a live- firing exercise on September 26, 2018 as part of the larger Vostok-2018, considered the largest Russian military exercise since the end of the Cold War. 3 It was also the first known live-fire test of the system by the Northern Fleet, which mobilized across the Northern Sea Route (NSR) to participate in the exercises in the Bering Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk. Commander of the Northern Fleet, Admiral Nikolai Yevmenov stated that ". . . the crew of the Bastion coastal missile system successfully carried out missile firing at a naval target position [in the Laptev Sea] at a range of over 60 kilometers to prove its readiness to effectively fulfill combat duty in the Arctic and protect the island area and the sea coast of Russia." 4 Both satellite imagery and ground footage released by the Russian Ministry of Defense show that the Bastion-P launchers and a command and control vehicle were positioned on the weapons pad at the southwest end of Temp Airbase for the exercise.

The Bastion-P system is a significant upgrade to Russia’s Arctic coastal defense system. While its range is limited and its location on Kotelny Island poses no immediate threat to the United States or neighboring countries, the Bastion-P system projects Russian sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction over the NSR at a time when the Kremlin actively seeks international investment to develop the route. The creation of more robust capabilities could also be in anticipation of a future Russian assertion of jurisdiction over its proposed extended outer continental shelf claims, which are currently under review by the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Moreover, these enhanced capabilities protect Russian assertion that the NSR is an internal rather than an international passage. A January statement from Richard Spencer, the U.S. secretary of the Navy, that the U.S. Navy will consider a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) in the Arctic could be viewed by the Kremlin as justification for a military response. In an ominous and possibly foreshadowing comment, President Putin recently stated that he “wouldn’t like to see the Arctic turning into something like Crimea . . . due to our failure to take timely measures.”

A view looking northeast at the two Bastion-P TELs deployed on the large weapons pad at Temp Airbase for a live-firing exercise. Barely visible a command and control vehicle with its antenna raised in the center of the image. The dirt runway of Temp Airbase is seen in the background, September 26, 2018. (Russian Ministry of Defense).

A close-up view of the command and control vehicle with its antenna raised in the center of the image. The administrative and housing trefoil is seen in the background, September 26, 2018 (Russian Ministry of Defense).

A Bastion-P TEL preparing to launch an Oniks missile, September 26, 2018 (Russian Ministry of Defense).

The launch of an Oniks missile from the Bastion-P TEL, September 26, 2018 (Russian Ministry of Defense).

THE MAKING OF KOTELNY

During the first two weeks of September 2013, a Russian Navy flotilla offloaded personnel, heavy engineering equipment, and material to begin construction of the new base on Kotelny. Aside from housing and support facilities, contemporaneous reports state that among the facilities to be constructed were an “air command unit,” medical center, satellite communications facility, naval dock, and a 2,500-meter airfield (then scheduled to be completed by the end of October)—subsequently identified as the Temp Airbase. 5 All of this was reported to be under the control of the Northern Fleet’s newly established 99th Arctic Tactical Group. 6

The first mention of any air or coastal defense missile systems deployed to Kotelny occurred during the Vostok-2014 exercise when Russian media announced that “. . . a Pantsir-S1 coastal missile system [based on Kotelny] opened fire [and] successfully hit a Termit air cruise missile target and proved their readiness to protect Russia's northern borders.” 7 The Pantsir-S1 (NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound) is a short-range point defense system capable of engaging aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and cruise missiles. Subsequent reports indicate that a battalion level unit equipped with the system was assigned to the 99th Arctic Tactical Group. 8 Satellite imagery from 2013-2014, shows that none of the unique pyramidal weapons pads for the system had yet been constructed.

During September-December 2015, three additional weapons pads were built in an area 3 kilometers northwest of the housing and administration trefoil. This was followed by the early 2016 construction of a conjoined weapons pad 4.7 kilometers northwest of the housing and administration trefoil. Construction of two large weapons pads on Temp Airbase subsequently took place during mid-2017. Concurrently three additional weapons pads were constructed further inland, in a rectangular-shaped pattern, approximately 3.7 kilometers north of the housing and administration trefoil. 11

Again, both the Pantsir-S1 and SSC-3 Styx systems participated in live-fire exercises again during 2016 and 2017. 12 These firing exercises were conducted from the new weapons pads along the coast and at Temp Airbase. Satellite imagery from August 31, 2017 supports this assessment as three Pantsir-S1 transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) were observed at the northernmost weapons pad.

WEAPONS PADS ON KOTELNY (AS OF MARCH 2019)

A GROWING AND MORE EFFECTIVE RUSSIAN MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE ARCTIC

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union viewed the Arctic as essential to its survivability: protection of its sub- surface strategic nuclear deterrent preserved second- strike capability while also deterring an attack. Twenty- eight years later, Russia’s military presence on Kotelny Island demonstrates a complex, layered coastal defense arrangement, which include Temp Airbase, the Sopka-2 radar system, and the Bastion-P and Pantsir-S1 coastal defense systems. Temp Airbase is not a minor installation; its length and size mean its capable of accommodating large cargo planes such as Il-76 for significant reinforcement. The Sopka-2 radar is part of a larger network covering the entirety of Russia’s northern border with penetration capabilities deeper into the central Arctic as seen on Russia’s most easterly facing Arctic island, Wrangel Island. As a cuing radar, the Sopka-2 collects data and intelligence to detect activity emanating toward the north. That data could be used to improve Russian domain awareness or direct surface-to-air missiles or guns to engage aircraft or cruise missiles. The addition of the Pantsir-S1 coastal defense system and the accompanying weapons pads reinforce Russia’s intent to defend its Arctic territory against foreign aircraft, UAVs, or cruise missiles, along with anti- ship systems (SSC-3 Styx and Bastion-P). Significant Russian improvements in its Arctic air and coastal defense over the past several years underscore its view of the Arctic as a tactical warfighting domain. In addition to the region’s role in Russia’s broader nuclear deterrent strategy, the Arctic is now a region to defend and to deny aerial maritime, or land access to NATO or U.S. forces. Russia’s efforts to secure its Arctic territory and coastline through improved air defense capabilities are vital stepping-stones to minimize its perceived defense vulnerabilities in the North.

Matthew Melino was an associate fellow with the Europe Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Heather A. Conley is senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the CSIS Europe Program. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr. is senior fellow for Imagery Analysis at CSIS.

This brief is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this brief.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies' Europe Program and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency partnership uses unclassified geospatial imagery and data to produce new, timely, and accurate reporting on Arctic construction and modernization of civilian, dual-use, and defensive infrastructure. For more info, read the Tearline Program Explainer .

To read more, visit NGA’s Tearline article or download the Tearline app from the Apple Store or Google Play .

This content also syndicates to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s website intelligence.gov , which is a transparency effort to better explain certain strategic, economic, and humanitarian IC missions to the public.

CSIS Briefs are produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

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Joseph S. Bermudez Jr.

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